The Dehumanising Truth of Singapore’s Abortion Access

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In the 1960s, Singapore abortion law based its liberalisation on future utility, not human worth. In the 2020s, dignity and coherence demand we rethink this.

Key points at a glance:

  • Singapore originally legalised and expanded abortion to control population growth and improve the ‘quality’ of its people.
  • Against parliamentary pushback, early ministers judged human life by its future economic usefulness rather than its basic worth.
  • This mindset makes any costly group vulnerable, from unborn children to elderly patients.
  • Coherence and human worth alike demand that Singapore reconsider abortion access laws built for population control.

Human worth is not a balance-sheet entry. It does not rise with economic usefulness or fall with economic cost. We instinctively act on this when we recognise that an employee who loses a job retains a claim to fair treatment. We know a child who needs expensive care still deserves protection.

This is because we believe human worth belongs to people by virtue of their humanity. A coherent population policy must maintain the same principle. Affirming inherent human worth, while making demographic usefulness the governing measure of whether a life should continue, therefore does not meet this standard.

As we shall see, Singapore’s abortion history exposes that incoherence. Ministers defended liberalisation through arguments about family resources, population growth and population ‘quality’. Those arguments explained the Government’s objectives but left the moral question unanswered: what protection does human life deserve in the womb?

Reducing Births to Serve the Population Plan

The Straits Times, 28 September 1975

The Abortion Act, passed in 1969 and implemented in 1970, permitted abortion on specified grounds, generally subject to approval by the Termination of Pregnancy Authorisation Board. A 1974 expansion widened access and abolished the board.

These changes accompanied government efforts to limit births. Then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew presented an economic argument for smaller families: Parents could concentrate money, time and attention on fewer children.

Resources spread across six or more children, he argued, denied each child opportunities available in a smaller family. Such choices would be voluntary, but their provision would be within a programme of state pressure to reduce births, particularly among lower-income families:

Until the less educated themselves are convinced and realise that they should concentrate their limited resources on one or two to give their children the maximum chance to climb up the educational ladder, their children will always be at the bottom of the economic scale.

Raising children requires resources, and poverty indeed restricts opportunity. But neither fact establishes that a poor family’s children have less worth, or that ending their lives is a justified response to hardship. Identifying a cost does not settle who should bear it, what assistance is owed or which responses are morally permissible.

Lee also proposed judging abortion and voluntary sterilisation laws by whether they tended “to raise or lower the total quality of our population”. He urged that people earning less than $200 a month should be encouraged “never to have more than two” children. His discussion connected population quality with education, income, IQ and parental upbringing.

The eugenic reasoning lies in that proposed test. Reproductive policy would be judged by how well it produced a population considered ‘better’. Parents’ economic and social characteristics became grounds for preventing society from facing “a large number of the physically, intellectually and culturally anaemic.”

Chua Sian Chin, then Minister for Health, dismissed religious and moral objections to the Abortion Bill in 1969. He insisted that ‘minority’ religious beliefs should not dictate policy in multi-racial and multi-religious Singapore, and played a key role in expanding abortion legislation through the initial bill introduced in 1968 and the subsequent Abortion Act of 1974.

He claimed it was vital to make accessible the “entire range of facilities ranging from family planning services to abortion facilities”. Additionally, he was not supporting “abortion on demand”, only as a final resort that would reinforce Singapore’s family planning policies. Unwanted children, he said, may “degenerate into delinquents, drug addicts, and so on.”

Yet the reasoning betrayed the mindset that a child’s supposed future conduct determined whether he or she deserved to live. Neither poverty nor anticipated delinquency answers the question of protection. Singapore thus allowed its wishes for the population to replace a moral account of what is owed to fellow human beings.

The Only Woman in Parliament Dissented

Parliamentary opponents raised questions about women’s welfare, sexual responsibility and the protection of life. Parliament’s makeup then was almost completely male. Chan Choy Siong, the only female MP at the time, rejected the presentation of abortion as a pain-free benefit for women:

According to the Minister for Health, the process is painless and will not affect the mother's health. Perhaps it is because he is not a woman that he does not know how it feels. Whether the performance of an abortion is painful and whether it is damaging to the mother's health, only a woman can tell.

She asserted outright that the “legalisation of abortion is tantamount to murder” and stated that “our women will suffer a great deal more” should the Bill be legalised. Additionally, she pointed out that many women who went for abortions would hail from low-income families and lack post-abortion health support.

Then-Paya Lebar MP Tay Boon Too warned that legalisation would encourage promiscuity and weaken social morality. Changing the consequences of sexual conduct could change behaviour, another effect that population calculations failed to answer.

Ng Kah Ting of Punggol also confronted the dismissal of opposition as religious:

I am opposed to a liberalised abortion policy because I think this would be bad for our nation. It is very easy to write off the opposition to this Bill as ‘religious objections’. This saves us the trouble of examining the rational arguments put forward against it. This enables us to evade the very pertinent questions raised, questions which have nothing to do with religion.

From 1974, the number of abortions conducted sharply rose. The figure reached its zenith at 23,512 abortions in 1985. Tragically, 35% of all pregnancies were terminated in 1985.

Among teenage pregnancies, the teenage abortion rate was 0.2 per 1000 female teenagers under 20 years of age in 1970. Once the radical 1974 Abortion Act materialised, the rate attained a peak of 13.7 per 1000 female teenagers in 1985.

Pro-abortion advocates refer to the aforementioned statues as legal grounds to continue pushing for abortion as a woman’s choice. They argue that present statutes permit liberal legal interpretations. Consequently, this supposedly requires abortion upon the mother’s request.

Each abortion ended an unborn human life, but neither the law nor the number answers whether those lives deserved protection. Parliament’s permission establishes what the state allows, not whether that allowance respects human worth.

The Government had claimed fewer births would advance a population objective. That result leaves unresolved the obligations owed to mothers, fathers and unborn children. An administrative success cannot answer a moral objection merely by achieving its target.

The Incoherence Must End

Human life deserves protection in the womb, and disputing that protection requires an argument addressing its grounds. Explaining the economic advantages of fewer births ignores that question.

We apply this distinction throughout public policy elsewhere. Demonstrating that an action reduces expenditure establishes its financial effect, for instance. Justifying the action requires examining the means used and the people affected. Otherwise, any sufficiently attractive aggregate benefit could displace the protection owed to an individual.

Once a large enough public benefit can override an individual’s claim to protection, by that logic every costly person becomes vulnerable. This is not confined to the pre-born. An elderly patient’s treatment competes with a hospital’s savings target; a disabled child’s care counts against a family’s finances. ‘Protection’ then lasts only until someone calculates that others would be better off without you.

If reducing population growth helped justify abortion liberalisation in the 1960s, declining birth rates in the 2020s demand that the Government defend or abandon that rationale. It must review the laws it introduced as instruments of population policy—or explain why those laws should escape scrutiny when demographic needs change.

An unborn child’s worth does not depend on how many births Singapore needs. That worth sets a standard that population policy must respect.

Angeline Tan
Angeline Tan
Angeline Tan has a background in international relations and history, and writes for various publications including Regardless SG and Live Action. She is passionate about families, languages and cultures, and importantly the pro-life cause.

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